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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 14-4818 
___________ 
 
VITOLD GROMEK, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
JUDGE PHILIP MAENZA, Morris County Superior Court;  
ANN R. BARTLETT, Hunterdon County Superior Court;  
JUDGE MARYLIN R. HERR, Director of New Jersey Division of Family Development;  
JEANETTE PAGE HAWKINS, Director of New Jersey Division of Family 
Development; JOHN/JANE DOE NOS. 1-20, NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF FAMILY 
DEVELOPMENT; JOSEPH ADIELE, Essex County Probation;  
INETTE HEWELL, Essex County Probation; SHAZEEDA SAMSUDEEN, VCPO, 
Essex County Probation; JANE/JOHN DOES NOS. 1-20, ESSEX COUNTY 
PROBATION; THOMAS WEISENBACH, Administrator of the Courts-Morris County;  
JOHN/JANE DOES NOS. 1-20, MORRIS COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT, FAMILY 
DIVISION; ADMINISTRATOR OF THE COURTS HUNTERDON COUNTY  
SUPERIOR COURT, FAMILY DIVISION; JANE/JOHN DOES NOS. 1-20, 
HUNTERDON COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT, FAMILY DIVISION;  
SHARON MILLER GROMEK 
 ____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil No. 14-cv-04455) 
District Judge:  Honorable Jose L. Linares 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Due to a Jurisdictional Defect  
and Possible Dismissal Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)  
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
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May 14, 2015 
 
Before: AMBRO, JORDAN and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: May 22, 2015) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
  Vitold Gromek appeals pro se from the District Court’s order dismissing his civil 
rights complaint as to several New Jersey state defendants.  For the reasons set forth 
below, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s order.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 
3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6. 
I. 
 In July 2014, Gromek filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United 
States District Court for the District of New Jersey alleging that a number of New Jersey 
state employees had violated his constitutional rights by mismanaging his child support 
matters.  Specifically, Gromek claimed that Child Support Services/Essex County 
Probation had incorrectly reported that he was in arrears by as much as $400,000.00, and 
has refused to correct the error.  Gromek further claimed that he has attempted to seek 
redress in the Superior Court of New Jersey, but the presiding judges have failed to 
address his motions, denied him an opportunity to present evidence, denied him his 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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appeal rights, and harassed and threatened him.  Gromek sought compensatory and 
punitive damages, and asked the District Court to intervene in the state matters, naming 
as defendants: Superior Court Judges Thomas L. Weisenbeck, Philip J. Maenza, Ann R. 
Bartlett, and Marilyn R. Herr; Essex County Probation officers Joseph Adiele, Inett 
Hewell, and Shazeeda Samsudeen; and the Director of the New Jersey Division of Family 
Development, Jeanette Page Hawkins (together, the “State Defendants”).1  
 The State Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) 
and (6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that: Gromek’s claims are barred 
by the Eleventh Amendment, and by the doctrines of absolute judicial and quasi-judicial 
immunity as well as the Rooker-Feldman doctrine; the State Defendants are not persons 
amenable to suit under § 1983; and Gromek’s state-law claims are barred under the New 
Jersey Tort Claims Act (NJTCA).  By order entered November 20, 2014, the District 
Court granted the motion to dismiss.  
 Gromek now appeals from the District Court’s order.  
II. 
 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise 
plenary review over the District Court’s order.2  See Haybarger v. Lawrence Cnty. Adult 
                                              
1 Gromek also named as a defendant his ex-wife, Sharon Miller Gromek.   
 
2 When Gromek filed his notice of appeal seeking review of the District Court’s 
November 20, 2014 order, that order was not yet appealable because Gromek’s claim 
against Ms. Gromek was still pending.  The District Court’s order became appealable, 
however, when the court entered a final order dismissing the remainder of the complaint.  
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Prob. & Parole, 551 F.3d 193, 197 (3d Cir. 2008).  Dismissal for failure to state a claim is 
proper if a party fails to allege sufficient factual matter, which if accepted as true, could 
“state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 
(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).  We may 
summarily affirm if the appeal does not present a substantial question, and may do so on 
any basis supported by the record.  Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(per curiam). 
III. 
 Upon review, we see no error in the District Court’s decision to dismiss the 
complaint as to the State Defendants.  First, the State Defendants are entitled to Eleventh 
Amendment immunity insofar as they were sued for damages in their official capacities.  
The Eleventh Amendment protects state employees from federal suit unless Congress has 
specifically abrogated the state’s immunity, or the state has waived its own immunity.  
Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev. Ctr., 621 F.3d 249, 254 (3d Cir. 2010); MCI Telecomm. 
Corp. v. Bell Atl.-Pa., 271 F.3d 491, 503-04 (3d Cir. 2001).  Congress did not abrogate 
the states’ immunity through the enactment of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see Quern v. Jordan, 
                                                                                                                                                  
See Cape May Greene, Inc., v. Warren, 698 F.2d 179, 184-85 (3d Cir. 1983) (explaining 
that a premature notice of appeal, filed after disposition of some of the claims before a 
district court, but before entry of final judgment, will ripen upon the court’s disposal of 
the remaining claims).  Gromek has not filed a notice of appeal seeking review of the 
latter order and the time to do so has expired.  See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A).  Therefore, 
we lack jurisdiction to review it.  See id. 3(a)(1) (directing an appellant to file a notice of 
appeal within the time allowed by Rule 4); Becker v. Montgomery, 532 U.S. 757, 765-66 
(2001) (clarifying that the content and timing requirements of the notice of appeal are 
jurisdictional in nature).   
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440 U.S. 332, 345 (1979), and New Jersey has not waived its immunity in federal court, 
see Port Auth. Police Benevolent Ass’n, Inc. v. Port Auth., 819 F.2d 413, 418 (3d Cir. 
1987), abrogated on other grounds by Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 
30 (1994).  Therefore, the District Court correctly concluded that the State Defendants 
were entitled to Eleventh-Amendment immunity from Gromek’s official-capacity 
damages suit.3  
 To the extent that Gromek intended to impose individual liability on the State 
Defendants, they are entitled to personal immunity.  First, it is well established that 
judges are immune from suit under § 1983 for actions arising from their judicial acts.  
Gallas v. Supreme Ct. of Pa., 211 F.3d 760, 768 (3d Cir. 2000).  “A judge will not be 
deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or 
was in excess of his authority; rather, he will be subject to liability only when he has 
acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.”  Azubuko v. Royal, 443 F.3d 302, 303 (3d 
Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (quoting Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978)); see 
also Figueroa v. Blackburn, 208 F.3d 435, 443-44 (3d Cir. 2000).  Given that Gromek 
                                              
3 Although the District Court did not consider Gromek’s requests for injunctive relief, the 
Younger abstention doctrine would counsel against the District Court’s interference in 
the state-court matter.  The United States Supreme Court has articulated a longstanding 
public policy against federal court interference with state court proceedings and instructs 
federal courts to refrain from taking any action in cases where the federal plaintiff has 
adequate redress in state-court proceedings.  Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43 (1971).  
Because it appears that Gromek continues to challenge the State Defendants’ actions in 
state court, it would be inappropriate for the federal courts to interfere with the state’s 
interest in adjudicating matters relating to child support obligations.  See Taliaferro v. 
Darby Twp. Zoning Bd., 458 F.3d 181, 192 (3d Cir. 2006). 
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complains of actions that the Superior Court judges took in the course of proceedings 
concerning his child support obligations, and that he has not set forth any facts suggesting 
that the judges acted in an absence of jurisdiction, they are protected by absolute 
immunity.  See Gallas, 211 F.3d at 772 (“[J]udicial immunity is not forfeited by 
allegations of malice or corruption of motive.”) (citation and quotation omitted).  
Therefore, the District Court properly dismissed the claims against the Superior Court 
judges on this basis.   
 The District Court also properly dismissed Gromek’s claims against Essex County 
probation officers Adiele, Hewell, and Samsudeen, and Family Development Director 
Hawkins.  Gromek alleges that he contacted these individuals in an effort to remedy the 
errors in his account, but that they failed to take appropriate action.4  The actions that 
these defendants took in the course of enforcing the Superior Court’s child support orders 
are protected by the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity.  See Forrester v. White, 484 
U.S. 219, 225-26 (1988) (describing the extension of judicial immunity to others who 
perform judicial, quasi-judicial, and prosecutorial functions); Gallas, 211 F.3d at 772-73 
                                              
4  We discern these allegations from Gromek’s submission in opposition to the State 
Defendants’ motion to dismiss, as Gromek did not indicate in the complaint what role 
these individuals played in the alleged misconduct.  We do not address whether dismissal 
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) would have been proper on this basis because, as 
discussed above, we affirm the dismissal of these defendants on the basis of immunity.   
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(explaining that judicial employees “functioning as an arm of the court” are protected by 
judicial immunity).5  
IV. 
 Because this appeal presents no substantial question, we will summarily affirm 
the District Court’s order.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10. 
                                              
5 Generally, a district court should provide a plaintiff an opportunity to amend his 
complaint before granting a defendant’s motion to dismiss.  We note, however, that we 
do not see how Gromek could have amended his complaint to overcome the immunity 
and abstention doctrines discussed above.  Therefore, any amendment would have been 
futile to Gromek’s federal claims.  See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 
114 (3d Cir. 2002).  Furthermore, to the extent that Gromek’s complaint can be read as 
raising any common law negligence claims, the State Defendants correctly contended that 
he failed to demonstrate that he complied with the procedures set forth in the NJTCA.  
See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 59:8-8, 8-10; Cnty. Concrete Corp. v. Town of Roxbury, 442 F.3d 
159, 173-74 (3d Cir. 2006).  Although Gromek did not have an opportunity to assert 
additional facts in support of any such claim in an amended complaint, he did submit a 
lengthy response to the State Defendants’ motion to dismiss, and did not respond to their 
argument in this regard.   
 
